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Exit as Critique. Communes and Intentional 
Communities in the 1960s and Today 
Philip Wallmeier ∗ 
Abstract: »Rückzug als Kritik. Kommunen und intentionale Gemeinschaften in 
den 1960er Jahren und heute«. While social scientists have traditionally con-
fined their attention to practices of critique modelled on collective, publicly 
visible speech acts, this article draws attention to practices of critique which 
take the form of individual, private, and mute acts of withdrawal. First, drawing 
on the pragmatic sociology of critique and its conceptualization of different 
“orders of worth,” it is argued that communards and inhabitants of intentional 
communities in the 1960s and today practice critique by withdrawing from 
conventional arenas of political participation and social interactions. Critique is 
performed through withdrawal because all legitimate channels towards the 
broad public appear blocked or useless. Second, this study points out differ-
ences within this “exit variety of critique” between the two time-periods. The 
transgressive withdrawal of communards in the 1960s was a radical critique of 
mainstream society and its values. In contrast, today’s communards withdraw 
from conventional arenas of social interactions to live in ways which more con-
sistently put into practice their beliefs and hence practice a reformist critique 
of mainstream society’s unsustainability and individualism. 
Keywords: Critique, exit, withdrawal, commune, intentional community, ges-
ture, sociology of critique, Boltanski, USA, 1960s. 
1.  Introduction1 
In 1970 some hundred university students – who had gathered regularly on 
Monday nights in San Francisco’s Haight-Ashbury to talk about politics, the 
enlightenment, or man’s relationship to nature – decided to take a trip through 
the United States together with their teacher, Stephen Gaskin, in 60 buses. 
After returning to San Francisco, the group did not want to split up again and 
                                                             
∗  Philip Wallmeier, Goethe University Frankfurt, Cluster of Excellence “Normative Orders”, Max-
Horkheimer-Straße 2, 60629 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; wallmeier@normativeorders.net. 
1  I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers and the research colloquium of Christopher 
Daase and Nicole Deitelhoff at the University of Frankfurt/Main – particularly Max Lesch, 
Jannik Pfister, and Sebastian Schindler – for comments on earlier drafts of this article. Fur-
ther, I would like to thank the editors of this special issue for their thoughtful remarks and 
insistence on precision. 
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founded the Commune The Farm in Tennessee, which still exists today. Found-
ing member Douglas Stevenson (2014, 217) explains that he decided to leave 
home, job, and family to start a commune because the assassinations of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy “made it painfully obvious that change 
would not come from within the system. […] [T]he revolution was in a new 
direction, to build an ark that could ride out the inevitable storms of an uncer-
tain future.” For Stevenson and many others, the founding of The Farm was 
equally a withdrawal from “inevitable storms,” a step “in a new direction” and a 
gesture of critique towards a system that seemed unchangeable “from within.” 
This coupling of withdrawal and critique in the communard’s praxis sits un-
easily with our prevalent understanding of dissent: While critique is usually 
associated with collective action, publicness, and speech, withdrawal, on the 
contrary, is understood as an individual action, as a private and mute gesture. 
Were Stevenson and the others misled about their actions and misrepresenting 
them for ideological or psychological reasons: Is what the communard “subjec-
tively” perceived to be critique, “objectively” just escapism? On the contrary, 
this article takes as its starting point that we should take Stevenson’s under-
standing of his own actions seriously. The overall aim of this article is hence to 
conceptualize an “exit-variety of critique” on the basis of an empirical analysis 
of the communal scene in the 1960s and today. By “commune,” I refer to a 
group of adults (and their children) who are not all directly related and who 
have chosen to live together to enhance their shared values or for some other 
(more or less) shared purpose (similarly: Sargent 1994, 14-5). This implies that 
what I call ‘commune’ has also been referred to as ‘communal venture,’ ‘utopi-
an community,’ ‘ecovillage,’ or ‘intentional community.’ I use these terms 
synonymously.2 
There is a normative, a methodological, and a diagnostic reason for taking 
the communards’ understanding of their praxis seriously. First, contemporaries 
of the 1960s’ communal wave found that student demonstrations were based on 
a less deeply troubled experience and outlook than the one “expressing itself in 
quiet withdrawal to rural America” (Veysey 1978, 454). Ignoring those who 
withdraw may hence mean to block from sight expressions of severe social 
suffering and moral discontent. Second, dismissing withdrawal as escapism 
relies on an asymmetrical methodology. The writings of communards testify to 
their own debates, whether and in how far their withdrawal was an act of cri-
tique or just a flight from responsibility. Hence, there is no easy way to estab-
lish the final truth on this question as scientific observer (cf. Celikates 2006). 
Third, more and more people are withdrawing from institutions and the state 
out of indignation. Whether this reaction is a desirable approach to social con-
                                                             
2  While using the terms ‘commune’ and ‘intentional community’ interchangeably, I tend to 
follow the dominant self-denomination of communards and use ‘commune’ for the period be-
tween 1964-1975 and ‘intentional community’ for the period between 2010-2012 (see part 5). 
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flicts or a promising political strategy is open to discussion. Certainly, howev-
er, this trend calls for a diagnosis that goes beyond dismissing these actors as 
misguided or apolitical romantics. 
In order to provide an empirically saturated idea of critique through with-
drawal, this article is structured as follows. In a first step, I elaborate on the 
uneasy relationship between the study of communes and the study of critique (2) 
and then propose to overcome this difficulty by studying the communal critique 
as engaged withdrawal on the basis of the “sociology of critique” (3). Based on 
this conceptual groundwork, I argue that the communal critique of the long 
1960s should be understood as a transgressive, radical social critique (4) and 
that the critique of today’s communes differs from their predecessors’: Today’s 
communards perform a reformist critique of mainstream society, calling for its 
transformation into a more meaningful, communal, and sustainable order (5). 
2.  An Uneasy Relationship: Communes and the Study of 
Critique 
Much has been written about critique from theoretical and conceptual points of 
view. Scholars have discussed the function, meaning, validity and normative 
foundations of critique – focusing especially on the possibilities of scholarly 
critique or Critical Theory (e.g. Geuss 1981; Honneth 2007; Forst 2013). In 
contrast to these broad theoretical discussions which Boltanski (2011) calls 
endeavours in “critical sociology,” the empirical study of practices of critique 
performed by actors outside of academia, the “sociology of critique,” has been 
rather limited (but see: Backhaus and Roth-Isigkeit 2016. Adloff and Pfaller 
[2017] and Schwarz [2017] in this volume even also study expressions of cri-
tique that are difficult to articulate and hard to grasp). Systematic empirical 
research on practices of critique, so far, has overwhelmingly used the terminol-
ogy and scientific lens of “social movement studies.” While there is greater 
diversity within social movement studies than can be described in this short 
paragraph, it seems fair to state that most scholars working within this para-
digm focus on acts of critique that are performed collectively, publicly – or are 
addressed to public authorities – and are expressed in speech – or are translata-
ble into a claim that can be voiced. Famously, Charles Tilly (1984, 306) for 
example, analyses instances of critique by studying social movements, which 
he defines as 
a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons success-
fully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representa-
tion, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for 
changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with 
public demonstrations of support. 
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The idea that to study critique means to study collective, public speech acts is 
not only an accidental feature of social movement studies. It is rooted in more 
general assumptions about critique that are shared by big parts of the social 
sciences. As Boltanski (2012, 169) points out, most social scientists build on a 
“fundamental opposition” between individual and collective acts of critique 
and “reject as outside their universe of competence manifestations of revolt or 
grievances whose authors act alone” assuming these are not cases of critique 
but rather of insanity or pathology, which could be better addressed by psycho-
analysis. Hirschman (1985, 31) further observed that most scholars of critique 
only register collective and public claims because they have conceptually con-
fined their attention to situations in which the only alternative to a collective 
articulation of critique is “acquiescence.” Recently Hatzisavvidou (2015) 
pointed out that the “speech-centeredness” of large parts of the social sciences 
often results in an invisibility of silent gestures of critique. 
This may explain, why communes barely feature in the scholarly literature 
about empirical instances of critique even though scholars interested in com-
munes and intentional communities have repeatedly pointed to their critical 
sting (two exceptions are: Brown 2002b, Lockyer 2007).3 The reason for this 
gap is, as Snow (2004) explains, that the communal critique is barely visible 
through the lens of social movement studies – the dominant paradigm for stud-
ying practices of critique. The communal critique does not take the form of 
collective, publicly visible speech acts which are directed towards authorities, 
but rather appears as its opposite – as silent gestures of withdrawal.4 To make 
sense of the critical sting of this withdrawal, the next section of this article 
unlocks conceptual spaces beyond this dominant scientific paradigm for study-
ing practices of critique. 
3.  The Exit-Variety of Critique 
While the dominant framework for conceptualizing practices of critique does 
not lend itself well to the study of communes, Hirschman’s (1985) differentia-
tion between “voice” and “exit” as two equally rational and effective reactions 
                                                             
3  Bohill (2010, 89) Brown (2002b, 158), Kanter (1972, 3) and Lockyer and Vereto (2015, 7) even use 
the term “critique” or “critical” to describe communes or intentional communities. Baker (2015), 
Eräranta et al. (2009), Grundmann and Kunze (2012), Grundmann et al. (2006), Miller (1999), 
Pepper (1991), Wallmeier (2015), and Willke (1983) attribute a critical function to them. 
4  While some conceptualizations of social movements may be better suited to studying the 
communal critique than Charles Tilly’s, it seems fair to state that social movement scholars 
overwhelmingly study practices of critique that are understood as collective and/or publicly 
visible and/or acts of claim-making. For a more elaborate discussion of how the social 
movements paradigm misrepresents or fails to capture the logic of the communal critique, 
cf. Schehr 1997.  
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to discontent unlocks conceptual spaces for studying the communal critique. 
Understood as reactions to an unfavourable situation which call for a justifica-
tion or legitimation, “exit” and “voice” have been called two “varieties of cri-
tique” by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007, 42).5 To clarify the difference be-
tween the two concepts, Hirschman (1985, 30) defines voice as 
any attempt to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of af-
fairs, whether through […] appeal to a higher authority […], or through vari-
ous types of actions and protests; 
in contrast, exit entails leaving or escaping from an unfavourable situation. In this 
conceptualization, exit and voice differ on three dimensions (Hirschmann 1986). 
First, “exit” is an individual action that is carried out in private while “voice” is 
often collective and carried out publicly. Second, “voice” aims at improving an 
unfavourable situation, while “exit,” even though it can and often does alert 
authorities of problems, does not have this overall aim. Third, “voice” needs to 
pin down specific problems, “exit” does not require such a specification. While 
“voice” hence refers to practices of critique that are also studied by scholars of 
social movements, the introduction of an “exit-variety of critique” unlocks new 
conceptual spaces, the size and shape of which I map in the following.  
3.1  Exit and the Sociology of Critique 
In order to map the shape and size of these conceptual spaces, I follow Boltan-
ski (2012, 29) in defining critique as a process of disengaging “oneself from an 
action so as to occupy an external position allowing the action to be considered 
from a different viewpoint.” Boltanski and Chiapello (2007, 36) describe this 
as a two-level process. On a first level, critique is acted out when a seemingly 
natural order breaks down and actors shift from a pre-reflexive to a reflexive 
mode of acting. This shift is prompted by an experience of indignation on the 
part of the critic or because she witnessed the suffering of others. On this level, 
disengagement may find expression in a physical reaction like a raised eye-
brow, a scream, or bodily withdrawal. On a second level, critique – at least to 
be sustained over the long run – further requires concepts and schemas which 
allow the critic to translate her individual and specific experience of indigna-
tion into a problem of more general concern. To generalize her suffering, she 
can refer to different “orders of worth” or “worlds.” These orders are irreducible 
to each other, and construct collective identities by tying them to an accepted 
higher common good. By referring to common orders of worth, actors hence 
establish collectives, exchange points of view and reach momentary and fragile 
agreements about what is the case in a situation and how to evaluate it. Put 
simply: They allow the critic to connect her individual experience of indigna-
tion to a collective, thus making a claim about what her individual suffering 
                                                             
5  Hirschman rarely calls exit and voice instances of critique, but see: Hirschman 1993, 200.  
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represents on a more general level (and what this general level consists of). 
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006, 133-8) describe six such worlds, each of which 
functions according to a particular logic, has its own vocabulary, sphere, ob-
jects, subjects, and “tests,” through which the correctness of a claim can be 
established.6 
Generalizations in the market world, for example, value low or high prices, 
speak the language of costs, goods, and desires, and can be tested on the basis 
of monetary exchanges. A person may, for example, criticize a decision be-
cause it is not profitable. The correctness of this claim can be “tested” on the 
market. Generalizations in the industrial world, on the other hand, value long-
term efficiency, speak the language of science, stability, and correctness, and 
can be tested on the basis of statistics. Within this order, a person may general-
ize her indignation by pointing out that an action was poorly planned. General-
izations in the civic world value the collective welfare, speak the language of 
impersonal regulations and equality and can be tested through formal proce-
dures. To criticize an action, a person may, for example, invoke a right. Gener-
alizations in the domestic world value personal relations and status, speak the 
language of hierarchy and family, and accept proof on the basis of personal 
relationships and stories. A person may, for example, generalize her indigna-
tion by pointing to tradition. Generalizations in the inspired world, in contrast, 
value grace and creativeness, speak the language of beliefs and intuitions, and 
accept proof which is provided through expressive performances. A person 
may invoke an insight or intuition to criticize an action. Finally, generalizations 
in the world of fame attribute worth to the popular, speak the language of iden-
tification and media, and can be tested on the basis of trends. One may, for 
example, criticize an action by pointing out that other people don’t like it. 
Based on this two-level conceptualization of critique, an analytic distinction 
can be introduced between reformist and radical critique. I speak of reformist 
critique when critique is generalized by referring to an order of worth which is 
institutionalized in the relevant situation: e.g. it is criticized that an election was 
manipulated and thus unequal (civic world). A radical critique, in contrast, 
transcends the situation by taking a totalizing perspective: e.g. representative 
democracy in general is criticized – even if elections are formally correct (cf. 
Boltanski 2012, 134). To summarize: critique may take the form of “exit,” 
individual acts of bodily withdrawal (first level of critique), which have to be 
generalized in order to become collective (second level of critique). Whether 
critique is radical or reformist depends on this generalization. 
                                                             
6  While the analyses of Thévenot et al. (2000) and Diaz-Bone (2015) include seven or eight 
orders of worth, in this article I leave open the question whether there is a “green world” or 
a “network world” and focus only on those worlds which clearly appear to be “grammars of 
legitimate social bonds in political modernity” (Blok 2013, 493). For an analysis of interna-
tional politics on the basis of this conceptualization, see: Gadinger 2016. 
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3.2  Studying the Exit-Variety of Critique Empirically 
Based on this map of the conceptual spaces which are unlocked through the 
introduction of an exit-variety of critique, an adequate path for the empirical 
analysis of the communal critique can be identified. Instead of relying on the 
terminology and scientific lens of social movement studies – which fails to 
capture the individual, private, and sometimes mute nature of the communal 
critique – I reconstruct how individuals react to indignation through exit (first 
level of critique), how they generalize their suffering (second level of critique) 
and whether this critique should hence be considered radical or reformist.  
To follow this path, this article compares the period with the greatest known 
upsurge of interest in communal living with the situation today. This compara-
tive perspective not only allows me to point out changes since the long 1960s. 
It also renders visible elements of the normative grammar of the communal 
scene which would otherwise be easily overlooked.  
The comparison is drawn on the basis of various texts written by or about 
communards, but particularly on an in-depth analysis of the journal communities, 
the largest magazine published by communards and dealing with communes 
and intentional communities in North America and world-wide since publication 
started in 1972. Hence, whenever in the following only two numbers appear 
after a quote, I reference communities (issue number, page number). 
As part of this research, 28 issues of the journal, published from 1972-1974 
and 2010-2012, were analysed in a two-step process. First, the texts from both 
periods were analysed through extensive reading aimed at finding out, which 
vocabulary authors used, which topics they touched upon, what they criticized 
or justified, and which beliefs and tests they referred to. The most relevant 
passages were highlighted. In a second phase, the highlighted passages were 
coded according to the different “orders of worth” or “worlds” (which are 
described above) and a memo was written for each passage, elaborating on the 
coding. The passages that I quote in this essay are chosen because they are 
representative of my overall findings.7 The overall aim of the following empiri-
cal analysis is to reconstruct the formation, normative grammar, and sting of 
the communal exit-variety of critique in the long 1960s and 2010s.  
4.  The Communal Critique in the 1960s  
In order to understand the formation of the communal critique of the 1960s, it 
is first necessary to recall some of the socio-economic and cultural features of 
the era. The 1960s saw the baby-boom generation of the post-war era grow up: 
                                                             
7  Methodologically, this essay hence closely follows Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) in their turn 
to symmetry between actors and scientist and more or less replicates their method of enquiry. 
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In the mid-1960s more than half of the US population was less than 25-years 
old (Gilcher-Holtey 2008, 52); the total amount of university student rose from 
1.7 Million in 1946 to 8 Million in 1970. Many of these new students came 
from lower and middle-class families. After the great recession of the 1930s, 
World War II had again lead to economic prosperity, an increasing demand for 
goods and services and “Suburbia” was just under construction. These social 
and economic changes went hand in hand with cultural changes. The 1960s 
saw an influx of Asian religions through the end of the war in Japan and new 
immigration laws while new drugs like LSD entered the scene. A critical view 
of US society, which had already been popularized in the late 1950s by writers 
of the Beat Generation, contraposed a dead, alienated, and inhuman American 
society to sex, drugs, and mystical experiences. Increasingly television brought 
far-away events from Washington and Chicago – the civil rights movement – 
but also from the six day war in Israel (1967) and especially the War in Vi-
etnam (1955-1975) directly to the homes of millions of Americans. While these 
developments provided the background conditions for the formation of the 
communal wave, in 1964 three events triggered its emergence: While the 
“Freedom summer murders” and the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” spurred 
anger among the youth, food stamps given out by the government as part of an 
anti-poverty programme made living apart from one’s family without a job 
possible (cf. Zablocki 1980, 51). 
While it is impossible to provide an adequate estimation of the number of 
communes that were founded as a reaction to these developments, the trend is 
obvious: Were there only a few handfuls of communes in the US (and world-
wide) in the early 1950s (Oved 2012, chapter 1), Miller (1999, xiii-xx) esti-
mates in his seminal work that towards the end of the 1960s there must have 
been tens of thousands of communes with 500 thousand to a million people 
involved in the US alone.  
At first sight these numbers seem to indicate that the communal wave of the 
1960s and 1970s should be understood as a “social movement,” a collective 
performance of critique through “voice” in the public realm. In contrast, in the 
following I show that it was rather a silent withdrawal of a mass of individuals 
from conventional arenas of political participation and the nuclear family. To 
make this claim, the following section first describes the withdrawal of indi-
viduals to communes as a bodily reaction to indignation (first level of critique) 
and then focuses on the communards’ attempts to interpret and generalize their 
individual indignation via language (second level of critique). 
4.1  Communes and the Gesture of Critique 
The “great communal tidal wave” (Miller 1999, xiv) of the 1960s was a social 
critique expressed in the bodily movement of more than 500,000 young Ameri-
cans who left their ‘old life’ behind. The journalist and counterculture chroni-
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cler Robert Houriet (1971, xii-xiii) summarized the spontaneous, emotional, 
individual, bodily and thus “inspired” nature of this simultaneous movement at 
the time by describing it as “a gut reaction of a generation.” Still today histori-
ans use metaphors like “something must have been in the air or in the water” 
(Miller 1999, 65) to explain the explosion of communes onto the scene. While 
these explanations are not to suggest that the communes had no precursors – 
they did, as Miller (1998; 1992) has shown – they do suggest that what at first 
sight may appear as critique voiced in and through “collective action” (associ-
ated with the “civic polity”) was rather embodied in a silent withdrawal of a 
mass of individuals from conventional arenas of political participation, from 
the nuclear family, and from the labour market, pushed out of mainstream 
society by alienation and pulled by a vision of the new and different.8 Evidence 
for this claim is provided in the following: communards were often unaware of 
each other, the communal scene was disorganized and marked by a fluctuation 
of people and ideologies so that no stable collective emerged. 
First, communards only realized what they had been part of, when the wave 
was long beyond its peak. There are many reasons for this. People joining 
communes came from small and large cities, from the East Coast, the South, 
and the West. Independent clusters of communes emerged in and around spe-
cific areas such as Cambridge, Berkeley, Greenwich Village, and the Haight 
Ashbury, but people in all parts of the country were gripped by the communal 
fever. Further, most communes were hidden. Still ten years after the emergence 
of the first big communes, Judson Jerome (1974, 6), a prominent communard, 
argued that “if you’ve heard of a commune, it’s not typical.” Underground 
newspapers about communes only had a small circulation. All in all, scholars 
agree that in the mid-1960s people were experimenting with communal living 
all over the US while being “largely unaware of each other” (Miller 1999, 65).  
Second, individual communes were – except for special cases – not collec-
tively organized according to efficient (industrial world), decent (domestic 
world), legal (civic world), economic (market world), or noteworthy (world of 
fame) principles. Rather, communards depended on their individual fortune: 
The internal organization of communes was assumed to emerge organically if 
people trusted “the flow” (inspired world). This meant that in contrast to most 
of the earlier communal societies (e.g. the Shakers or Amana Society [cf. Mil-
ler 1998]) the communes of the 1960s and 1970s were, for the biggest part, not 
even close to financially self-sufficient. Most communards spent as little as 
possible and lived of government resources, donations from rich supporters, or 
received what was called “love money” from their parents (Berger 1981). 
Overall, even though individuals often shared with each other what they had, 
                                                             
8  In this article I refrain from calling the communal scene a “movement” in order to empha-
size the individual, mute and often private character of the acts of withdrawal which are 
described (see: Section 2). 
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communards depended more on their individual good fortune and “the flow” 
than on collective organization. 
Third, the communal scene of the long 1960s was marked by a fluctuation 
of people and ideologies. While the terms “commune,” “family,” or “tribe” 
suggest small, static, closed groups (domestic world), communards lived a 
rather flexible way of life. Much in contrast to the nuclear family, membership 
in communes changed on a regular basis. Often it was difficult to distinguish 
between people who were part of a group and those who were only visiting. 
Part of the reasons for this uncertainty was that few communes had clearly laid 
out “admission procedures.” Most so called “hippie communes” even made 
free movement their mission: whoever came, could stay for as long as they 
pleased and leave whenever they pleased. Rather than separate groups, the 
1960s saw the emergence of a communal scene that was marked by fluctuation 
and a movement of individuals between places unheard of in earlier communal 
groups (cf. Oved 2012, 85). Only for very few people in the 1960s the commu-
nal adventure was thus an experience of living one ideology, at one place with 
one specific group.9 
Overall, the communal endeavour of the long 1960s was marked neither by 
the ideological purity, stability, internal homogeneity, and distinction from an 
outside of earlier utopian movements, nor by the organization, visibility, and 
collectivity of earlier social movements. Rather it was marked by economic 
disorganization, heterogeneous ideologies, and a constant fluctuation of people. 
Hence, this communal wave should be first of all understood as a mass exodus 
of individuals from traditional politics, from hierarchical family-relationships, 
and from the labour market. It was a critical gesture that was equally driven by 
personal feelings of pain and guilt as well as by a vision of a better society that 
could not be fully explicated in language.  
Despite this inexplicable character, however, in order to sustain their cri-
tique beyond the moment of overflowing emotions (first level of critique), 
communards needed to generalize their critique (second level of critique). The 
following section thus reconstructs how communards interpreted and specified 
their individual indignation via language in order to generalize it. 
4.2  Communes and the Language of Critique 
An interpretation and specification of what communes were about started tak-
ing off towards the late 1960s and early 1970s. Communards engaged in a 
textual interpretation of their activities while insisting that texts could never 
fully capture and convey what their inspired struggle was about. The Journal 
                                                             
9  The stable and rigidly organized religious or spiritual communes may appear to be an excep-
tion. However, even the people who joined rigidly organized religious communes often had 
been on the move for a long time and rather “ended up” there for some time (cf. Tipton 1984). 
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communities, which is the primary source of data here, is a product of this work 
of interpretation. Early issues of the journal are filled with anecdotes, visions, 
and sometimes poems, genres of text which often serve as proof in the “in-
spired order.” Few articles take the form of impersonal political statements 
(civic world), or personal stories (domestic world), close to no articles provide 
proof through numbers (industrial world), prices (world of the market), or 
popularity trends (world of fame). While the writings do not provide a direct 
access to the meaning of the communal critique, they allow a reconstruction of 
how communards generalized their indignation (second level of critique) and 
hence of the normative grammar of the communal critique. 
Most communards in the 1960s describe the situation in the US and their 
role within it as unbearable. Packing up the most necessary stuff to leave fami-
ly, home, education, certificates, jobs, and opportunities behind is not described 
as a rational, thought-through plan. Rather, they emphasize the indignation that 
pushed them out of “mainstream society”: “We had to leave. We couldn’t take 
it any longer” (3, 17), we “dropped out of the insanity” (1, 54) are only some of 
the expressions which are often found. The following passage exemplifies how 
communards attempted to generalize their indignation through language. 
We have all experienced, directly and indirectly, the frustrations and outrage 
of living in contemporary American society. Our involvement in the wars rag-
ing around the world, the rape of our environments, the rampant consumerism, 
wastemaking, and people exploiting of corporate capitalism, the perversions 
of technology into weaponry and gadgetry, the violence that characterizes our 
social relationships, the sterility and irrelevance of our educational systems are 
only part of our litany of complaints that defines the despair and discontent we 
feel in a society more open to decorative than to real change. In spite of the 
inducements of material comfort and the excitement of technical novelties, we 
are all too aware that our culture is basically death oriented. (3, 2) 
As this passage exemplifies, most communards were closer to a scream than to 
an analysis in their writings. Strong convictions are expressed and the authen-
ticity of their critique is transported by an emotional tone which carries writer 
and text away, rather than finding expression in it (for this genre of text, cf. 
Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 298-9). The passage’s explicit reference to feel-
ings such as “frustration,” “outrage,” “despair,” and “discontent” further gives 
evidence to the claim that most communards in these early years were incapa-
ble or unwilling to give their negative feelings a specific name. An analysis of 
the problems that communards are criticizing or a statistic about “wastemak-
ing,” is nowhere to be found. Even discussions about strategies for social 
change are scarce. These early writings are dominated by their expressive char-
acter, as if to say: This critique needs no further proof than to be screamed with 
the vigour of indignation.  
This inspired critique is directed at subjects, objects, and figures from dif-
ferent worlds, but often aligns with ideas and values from the civic and the 
domestic world. In the excerpt above, for example, the communard describes 
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his feelings on an individual level as experiences made with “our” “contempo-
rary American society.” Emotions thus serve as a direct link between the author 
and society, between the public and the private. Thereby “the people of Ameri-
ca” (civic world) are invoked as both the cause of the identified negative feel-
ings as well as a possible addressee of the writings. It is noteworthy, however, 
that the author does not invoke American politics, but society in this context. In 
this way, he addresses the people as private citizens and a potential collective 
subject (the people and their general will), but not in the way they are or can be 
politically constituted here and now as a collective (i.e. through petitions, vot-
ing, parties, etc.). The term “litany” – which also refers to a kind of prayer in 
which a clergyman recites a text and the believers respond in a recurring for-
mula – further underscores this idea of a general will which is not constituted 
through instruments available in the public realm, but only through the simul-
taneous expression of peoples’ feelings as individuals. People are assumed to 
be touched by the grace of deeper insights. In this invocation of “the people,” 
the civic and the inspired world are hence brought into close contact (e.g. 
Boltanski and Thévenot 2006, 298). 
This list of “frustrations” and “outrages” further brings together subjects, 
objects, and figures from different worlds and different spheres of life that do 
not touch in the usual flow of day-to-day activities. The “education system,” 
which involves pupils, teachers, specific buildings, and books, is connected 
with “wars,” involving soldiers, airplanes, arms, and strategies, “personal rela-
tionships,” involving bodies, gestures, histories, and emotions, “the environ-
ment,” trees, animals, and wastewater-cycles, and “consumerism,” involving 
people, money, stores, and commodities. The list is held together by nothing 
but the individual indignation which is expressed at them and which involves 
only private judgements based on the inspired and the domestic world, which 
can hardly be generalized. While, for example, “wars” are objects of the civic 
world, they are not criticized in the terminology of international law or democ-
racy, but only indirectly because they are “raging.” Just like “rampant consum-
erism,” these “wars” are regarded as driven by mad emotions and completely 
out of control, thus contradicting values such as decency, respect, and the con-
trol of ones feelings (domestic world). Decency and humility are also invoked 
when the author describes technology as “perverted,” the love and warmth of 
family-relationships are invoked when competition is characterized as “violent” 
and leading to “despair.” 
In the writings of the 1960s communards, these objects from different 
worlds were often connected to individual, private, and non-generalizable 
judgments on the basis of a particular figure which is central to the communal 
critique: the idea of a rotten and corrupting culture. While the author in the 
quoted passage does not make any analytical statement about the causes of the 
identified problems, he explicates that the elements of this “litany” altogether 
“define” (that is: are part of the necessary expression of) the “despair” he feels. 
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For the author, the problem is living in a society that is “more open to decora-
tive than real change”; that is: a society in which “technical novelties” and 
“material comfort” give the appearance of progress while only glossing over 
the fact that “real change” is impossible because “the culture” is “death orient-
ed.” By equating “material comfort” and “technical novelties” with appearanc-
es and death, again the author expresses an inspired critique of “society,” com-
paring its materialism and falseness to an authentic and pure life. Thus, without 
explicitly invoking causal relationships, he identifies a particular figure as the 
root problem: the “death orientation of culture.”10 It is important to point out 
that in this interpretation of what is going on in the world, “American society” 
and its “culture” are contraposed to the mass of individuals, who make up this 
society; the culture’s destructiveness finds expression in a litany of complaints 
of the people as individuals who “are all too aware” of what is going on. 
Hence, while connecting the long list of sufferings logically by describing its 
common root cause, this generalization at the same time leaves the communal 
critique somehow fractured. While the people as individuals are described as 
“aware” of the problems, the collective (“society”) and its political instruments 
of generalization are described as “defined” (and hence pervaded) by a death-
oriented culture. The civic sphere appears blocked to the expression of critique. 
4.3  Communes and the Praxis of Critique 
Communards attempted to generalize their suffering, establish a collective and 
sustain their critique through textual interpretations of their own activity in 
many small underground journals, like communities. As the analysis above 
shows, however, the inspired character of this critique made its formalization 
and institutionalization through text very difficult. Since the communards’ 
critique built on individual insights and emotions, generalizations within the 
scene never superseded the form of a common “litany” of frustrations and 
outrages. Attempts at forming a collective through the instruments available in 
the civic world were mostly discarded since these instruments would also be 
infected by the death-oriented culture. The only possible collective was hence a 
mass of individuals following their inspired insights. This individualistic and 
non-formalized character established at best a very fragile bond between com-
munards, which was constantly challenged from within (and from without).  
Evidence for this instability is provided by the often harsh critique, which is 
levelled at communal practices from within the scene. For example, from early 
                                                             
10  Similar to “the culture,” “the system” was also often invoked by communards as a root 
problem. Often denunciations took forms such as “insane system,” “system of hypocrisy,” 
“system of hierarchy and competition” (6, 20) or “dehumanizing system” (3, 22). The term 
“system” (like the term “culture” in the example) referred to the overall circumstances which 
pervade human activity and lead people in their day-to-day activities, to do things which 
they know to be meaningless and false. 
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on, some communards described communes as private, exclusive clubs of 
white middle-class people (denouncing the domestic character based on civic 
values): 
While the white stockbroker is too busy hustling his money to take time out to 
move against the war, the white communard is too busy working his garden 
[…] and both are too busy with their own thing to come to the aid of less priv-
ileged non-whites (or poorer whites). (1, 2) 
From the opposite vantage point, communards also pointed out that the applica-
tion of instruments of coordination from the civic world obstructed the “truly 
inspired” path to social change. A communard, for example, remarks that the 
promised new society 
looks remarkably like the old one with long hair: […] celibacy and promiscui-
ty instead of satisfaction and pleasure in a total relationship; a priori commu-
nity instead of a posteriori fraternity; legislated openness; and an honesty that 
merely replaces slyness as the new manipulative force in the same power 
game. (2, 43) 
Yet other communards criticized this inspired character by pointing out that 
they felt like “mature adults” and hence were not ready anymore for the child-
ishness of the “regular ‘communal’ project” (1, 58). Last, critics invoked a 
compromise between the industrial world, the civic world, and the world of 
fame, pointing out that life in most communes was uncomfortable, that com-
munards had to work hard and that this was therefore hardly a promising strat-
egy to bring about change: “A subsistence lifestyle has meagre social impact 
and little appeal to most people. We are aiming at social change” (3, 5). 
Overall, the communes which emerged in the long 1960s should be under-
stood as products of a mass of inspired, individual gestures of withdrawal 
based on indignation. While the texts in communities are coloured by the in-
sights and feelings which carry their writers away (inspired world), the texts 
also make reference to values such as decency (domestic world) or justice 
(civic world) and criticize American society for its materialism (market world), 
its inauthenticity (world of fame) and its systematic failure (“death-oriented 
culture”). However, even though communards acted in similar ways at a simi-
lar time, their critique was never grounded in a common order of worth, and 
was not carried by an organized collective, but rather embodied in a disor-
ganized mass. Coordination among communards was not achieved on the basis 
of a common principle of justice, but rather by the movement of bodies through 
space: whenever a conflict came up among communards, one was free to leave.  
Hence, the communards did not perform a reformist critique of a specific 
test. In their disdain for institutionalizations, collectively shared orders of 
worth, or tests, the communards did not even seek justice – if justice is under-
stood as a state in which people can be legitimately ordered according to their 
worth and not to their strength. Rather, this withdrawal of people constituted an 
“existential test” in the terminology of Boltanski (2011, 107-8). Existential 
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tests are experimental performances driven by an experience of indignation, 
which in their transgression often entail moments of joy. They are expressions 
of experiences which are “difficult to formulate or thematise,” of indignation 
that cannot be addressed since the status quo does not provide any established 
formats or even categories to do so. Precisely because they go beyond what can 
be explicated in a situation, existential tests allow for a moment of exteriority 
and (at least implicitly) refer back to the limits of what can be said and done. 
This way they put into question entire situations – the norms, conventions and 
even the terms in which situations are understood and described on a day-to-
day-basis. The communards performed this radical critique through individual, 
physical acts of withdrawal as the early communard Judson Jerome (1974, 57) 
nicely summarized: 
What do people want? Something beyond sustenance and reason, even beyond 
affection, beyond justice. Just one more rush. Insatiably. Their signals flicker 
their unity across the night. Already they are bathing the horizon in trans-
forming fire. 
The communal critique of the 1960s is hence best understood as a radical cri-
tique of the fundamental conditions under which critique could be articulated 
and of the legitimate instruments to form collectives that were available in the 
civic sphere. 
5.  The Communal Critique Today 
“You never change anything by fighting the existing reality. To change some-
thing, build a new model that makes the old obsolete.” This statement by 
Buckminster Fuller, inventor of the geodesic dome and inspiration to the coun-
ter culture of the 1960s, is displayed in the beginning of a movie made by con-
temporary communards about their network of ecologically oriented com-
munes, so-called ecovillages. This anecdote hints to the continuities and 
differences in the communal critique between the two time periods, which the 
following section is about.  
While in the late 1960s thousands of communes emerged in one big wave, 
the contemporary communal scene did not emerge simultaneously and its for-
mation cannot be traced back to specific “trigger-events.” It is thus not surpris-
ing that existing communes differ widely in terms of organization and political 
orientation:11 There are small rural fully income sharing communities, and 
large polyamorous communities, in which property is private; there are medi-
um-sized urban co-housing arrangements with monthly meetings, and every-
                                                             
11  For the case of xenophobic communes, see e.g. the exploration of “Private Aryan Communi-
ties” (Simi and Futrell 2010, chapter 7). 
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thing in-between and beyond. To get a sense of the commonalities of this het-
erogeneous scene, in the following I tease out some differences to the 1960s-
communes. 
First, the number of communal projects has decreased significantly since the 
1960s. In contrast to tens of thousands of communes, in 2016 the Federation of 
Intentional Communities lists 1226 established communities in the US. Their 
inhabitants are, on average, older than the 1960s-communards at the time, 
many of whom were in their early 20s and often enough college-drop-outs. In 
contrast, Metcalf (2012, 24) estimates that the average inhabitant of intentional 
communities today might be in her mid-40s. Second, since most of today’s 
communards join a commune after already having supported themselves finan-
cially, these demographic changes go hand in hand with changes in the eco-
nomic organization of communes. Few communards today depend on govern-
ment welfare, many (if not most) have jobs outside their community and are 
(more or less) integrated into the regular labour market. Many communities 
have developed goods and services around their way of life and generate an 
income by running centres for sustainability education, retreat centres for spir-
itual seekers, or by offering workshops on topics ranging from “consensus 
decision making” to “the art of tantra.” All in all, in contrast to the 1960s-
communes, today’s communities are financially more stable. This more orga-
nized character of the scene (industrial world) is, third, also mirrored in its 
membership. There is less fluctuation today than in the 1960s. Part of the rea-
son for this continuity is that intentional communities today have explicit ac-
ceptance procedures for new members that often take longer than a year. Thus, 
an outside is discernible from an inside (domestic world). This stability has, 
fourth, also lead to a better connection between intentional communities. In 
contrast to the 1960s, today’s communards are not only aware of other projects, 
but mostly connected on a national and even transnational scale (cf. Oved 
2012). These connections can be so tight that observers speak of intentional 
communities as a truly transnational phenomenon (Grundmann and Kunze 
2012; Litfin 2009). These transnational connections went hand in hand with a 
more global agenda of most communards (Litfin 2014). Finally, the described 
features of today’s communal scene are mirrored in its normative grammar and 
hence in its critique. Most of today’s communards prefer to denote their ar-
rangement as “intentional community,” “ecovillage,” or “co-housing communi-
ty.”12 They are often weary of the word “commune” because of its “assumed 
connection with cults, drugs, free-sex, hippies, and crash-pads” (Graber and 
Barrow 2003, 11) but have equally shunned the terms “family” or “tribe.” This 
                                                             
12  To be precise, this is only true for the English speaking parts of the world. For example in 
Germany the term “commune” (Kommune) is used by those communities who share all their 
income to distinguish themselves from those communities where people “merely” live to-
gether (cf. Kommuja 2014). 
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self-denomination is evidence of a heightened concern about the way com-
munes are perceived by “the public” (polity of fame). On the other hand, it also 
shows that today’s communards have taken up parts of the critique which was 
levelled at their predecessors for being dysfunctional, indecent, or unappealing 
(domestic and industrial world, world of fame).  
Since most of today’s communes are hence populated by a clearly demar-
cated group of professionals, are financially stable, transnationally connected, 
and concerned about their image in the public, moving to an intentional commu-
nity is hardly an ascetic performance of withdrawal beyond any normative 
compromise anymore. Also from the perspective of the public, it does not stand 
out as clearly from the flow of day-to-day activities, is more easily accepted as 
a lifestyle choice and hence no longer perceived as an act of transgression. The 
following sections of this article explicate in which way the exit of people into 
communes should nonetheless be understood as an act of critique. For the 
purpose of comparability with my depiction of the communal critique of the 
1960s, I again first analyse the founding of communes as a silent gesture of 
critique (first level of critique), and then consider how communards interpret 
their praxis in texts in order to generalize their critique (second level of critique). 
5.1  Communes and the Gesture of Critique 
Since joining and founding communes is a much more technical, reflexive, and 
less experimental process today than it was in the 1960s, its critical sting depends 
less on the transgressive withdrawal from mainstream society and more on the 
withdrawal to a specific setting. Evidence for this claim is provided in the 
following by explicating some of the dominant features of today’s communal 
scene.  
For example, most of today’s intentional communities have institutionalized 
procedures to consume less energy and resources. The simplest of these institu-
tions is the sharing of tools, cars, and living space. Many communities grow 
their own food or buy it through long-term contracts with local farmers so that 
the energy needed for transportation is reduced (Dawson 2006, 50-1). While 
some intentional communities use solar panels in order to produce their own 
electricity, others rely on sewage systems made out of plants which establish a 
closed water-cycle within the community. Popular are furthermore outside 
recycling toilets which not only function without the use of water, but at the 
same time produce new and fertile soil, which can be used for agriculture. The 
exit of people from mainstream living arrangements towards communes can 
hence be understood as expression of the desire for the implementation of more 
sustainability-oriented institutions in mainstream society. The planning and 
long-term financial investments which have to be put into these artefacts and 
instruments are further expressions of the communities’ industrial normative 
grammar.  
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This industrial grammar, however, is complemented and compromised with 
the inspired world. Work and planning not only goes into making intentional 
communities more environmentally sound, but also into the construction of the 
community itself. This is most obviously expressed in the self-denomination of 
the groups as “intentional communities”: groups in which a pre-reflexive, fleet-
ing transcendental social bond is to be brought about through careful long-term 
planning. Planned and coordinated communal activities range from simple 
neighbourhood meetings, to common meals, consensus decision-making pro-
cedures or common child rearing. Community is also the goal of the architec-
tural design of contemporary communities. Entire books explain how a place 
needs to be constructed in order to invite and facilitate “quality human interac-
tion.” The communard and author of a book about the architecture of intention-
al communities, Jan Martin Bang (2002, 19), for example, advises readers to 
build a communal centre from which the different houses and roads within the 
community can be seen so that people often meet “by accident.”  
Overall, the performance of critique by communards today depends less on 
their withdrawal from city flats and regular jobs and more on the successful 
organization and implementation of living arrangements which allow people to 
live more sustainable (industrial world) and communal lives (inspired world). 
Thus, the bodily, practical character of critique plays a different role today and 
is more easily translated into language. While the textual interpretation of their 
bodily withdrawal caused a lot of friction among the 1960s communards – who 
saw themselves confronted with the task of translating their inspired search for 
transcendental community into language – many of today’s communards con-
sider this work of explication and explanation part of their performance of 
critique. How communards today generalize their indignation and which nor-
mative compromises are established in this way, is the topic of the next section 
of this article.  
5.2  Communes and the Language of Critique 
The textual interpretation and specification of what communes are about has 
reached an unprecedented level today. There are hundreds of books about 
communal living, ranging from general reflections to biographies, histories of 
single communities, to the most prominent genre of texts: best-practice guides. 
This range of genres already hints to the fact that today’s inhabitants of inten-
tional communities less often interpret and generalize their action by referring 
to individual feelings – “litanies of complaints” – but rather by appealing to 
scientific facts. The following passage exemplifies this. 
In a world of trouble – overpopulation, diminishing natural resources, deterio-
rating infrastructure, escalating climate risk, and desperation caused by widen-
ing economic disparities – the global market economy continues to insist that 
we define success by maximum consumption. Avoiding the logical outcomes 
of greed and short-term behaviors will require a high level of local to global 
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collaboration and innovation. What we need are practical examples that 
demonstrate our capacity to live lightly on the land, minimize dependency on 
scarce resources, and creatively share both challenges and joys. (158, 49) 
There are important similarities and differences between the critique that is 
expressed in this paragraph and the one which is quoted above for the analysis 
of the communal critique in the 1960s. Like in the 1960s, the author provides a 
long list of “troubles” without any further analysis of their internal or logical 
connection. Like in the 1960s, the list assembles objects, subjects, and figures 
from very different worlds: “overpopulation” refers to bodies worldwide, to 
procreation, and modern medicine, while “natural resources” refers to trees, 
water, clean air, and “deteriorating infrastructure” refers to streets, train-lines, 
and so on. These “troubles,” however, are not problematized because of the 
feelings of indignation they arouse in individuals (which was the case in the 
1960s), but rather from a scientific point of view, which is expressed in con-
cepts such as “overpopulation” and “diminishing natural resources,” which 
reference scientific texts and terms. Hence, this critique is less rooted in indi-
vidual feelings and more strongly in the industrial world; it criticizes the world 
for what “objectively” seem to be trends with a negative outlook.  
These scientifically established problems are juxtaposed to one of the most 
important forms of the market world, the “global market economy.” While the 
author does not imply that the named “troubles” are caused by the global mar-
ket, it is implied that the market will not solve them because of its driving 
principle: maximum consumption. This industrial critique of the “irrationality” 
of the market world is further emphasized by pointing to the desires that drive 
the market (maximum consumption, greed, short-term behavior, etc.). It is 
noteworthy that the author addresses “greed” and “short-term behavior” but 
does not criticize that those feelings are “indecent” or “unworthy” (figures 
from the domestic world). Neither does he establish an opposition between the 
“greedy” and those who suffer from “desperation” (a figure from the civic 
world). Rather, the author points in an industrial language to the “logical out-
comes” of “greed,” which have to be “avoided.” To avoid them, we need “col-
laboration and innovation” (a compromise between the inspired and the indus-
trial world).  
This “collaboration” must go beyond the level of the state. While “US socie-
ty” was regarded as the relevant level of analysis by the 1960s-communards, 
today “global collaboration” is called for. Thereby this critique skips the insti-
tutionalized space of the civic world, in which there are legitimate tests and in 
which instruments for the formation of political collectives exist. Going beyond 
the state, the only way for communards to reach a possible “public” are the 
media. What “we” need – the communard goes on to explain, thus implicating 
the “citizens of the world” – are “practical examples” (industrial world) that 
“demonstrate” (world of fame, industrial world, and inspired world) our “ca-
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pacity” to “minimize” the reliance on scarce resources and creatively share 
both challenges and joys (industrial and inspired worlds).  
Since this last part touches upon a possible solution to the described “trou-
bles,” it allows for a reconstruction of the normative compromise that is in-
voked here between the industrial world, the inspired world, and the world of 
fame. This compromise is held together by the understanding of contemporary 
intentional communities as sites of “demonstration,” which takes a threefold 
meaning. First, communards argue that their communities’ efficiency and long-
term reliability can be measured and the results of these studies can be used for 
future planning. In this context, “demonstration site” also means “research site” 
(industrial world). At the same time, intentional communities are considered 
sites of demonstration in so far as through them people can imagine a better, 
more communal way of life. In this context “demonstration site” means place 
for inspiration (inspired world). Finally, communities can be written about, 
represented, and identified with through the media and thus from afar. Here 
“demonstration site” means group to identify with (world of fame). 
5.3  Communes and the Praxis of Critique 
Today’s communards go about their exit in a much more systematic way than 
their predecessors. While the 1960’s communes often merely appear as the by-
products of individual search motions and escape routes, the critique of today’s 
communards relies on the design of the respective communities and their insti-
tutions, on the way of life that is put into practice and on the way this is com-
municated to the outside world. This performance of critique requires a physi-
cal motion of a person’s body to a commune and texts which explain this 
gesture. While the texts inform a public that there is a way of life that is sup-
posedly more communal, more sustainable, and more fulfilling, the communes 
and people actually living in them figure as proof for these claims. In this way, 
today’s communards perform a reformist critique that is based on a compro-
mise between the industrial world, the world of fame, and the world of inspira-
tion. As demonstration-sites, today’s intentional communities have become an 
object in the world of fame that can be known, promoted, and identified with; 
they have become loci in the world of inspiration through which people envi-
sion more fulfilling lives and a different social order; and they have become 
objects in the industrial world, the efficiency and long-term sustainability of 
which can be measured and used as evidence in further planning and construc-
tion efforts.  
It should, however, also be noted that this compromise is not fully closed 
and somewhat unstable. The critique which is levelled at the compromise from 
within the scene is evidence for this claim. For example, a communal planner 
criticizes the inspired, spontaneous, and visionary values of some communards 
as naïve. He points out: 
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All too often, people try to form ecovillages without a solid understanding of 
the legal and technical issues associated with large numbers of people living 
on the same piece of land together. (156, 22) 
For others, on the contrary, the well-planned and comfortable industrial setting 
of the projects corrupts the genuine, inspired character of the gesture of moving 
to an intentional community – because of which it is perceived as a gesture of 
critique: 
Intentional communities are a middle class indulgence, not a serious choice 
for those who are ready to roll up their sleeves and get into the trenches to bat-
tle hierarchy, oppression, and social injustice. (144, 6) 
Yet others hold against these arguments that today’s intentional communities 
are only critical in so far as they make themselves known. From this perspec-
tive, however, it is often the inward-focused, inspired nature of the projects 
which is problematic: 
ecovillages often seem to actively encourage the outsiders’ view of them as 
woo-woo and disconnected from, or unsympathetic to, the wider culture. […] 
However, to change the wider world, you need to move gradually from being 
called weird to being called visionary. (63, 156) 
In opposition to this criticism, other communards point to the tension which 
arises from too much publicity. A person living in a community that is regular-
ly visited for educational purposes for example writes that “[l]iving in the mid-
dle of a demonstration site means living under observation” because of which 
“the core group of people struggles to find time for deeper connection” (147, 
17). These criticisms, small cracks and tensions within the normative grammar 
of today’s communes testify to the fact that the communal scene is far away 
from a solid normative compromise. At the same time, they remind us that 
whether and in how far the exit of people into communes should be understood 
as critique is constantly negotiated by the actors themselves. 
6.  Conclusion 
While social scientists have traditionally confined their attention to practices of 
critique modelled on collective, publicly visible speech acts, this article draws 
attention to practices of critique which take the form of individual, private, and 
mute acts of withdrawal. By introducing an “exit-variety of critique,” concep-
tual spaces for the empirical study of instances of critique beyond the paradigm 
of social movement studies are unlocked. Based on a definition of critique as a 
two-level process of disengagement, I show that communards in the long 1960s 
and today performed acts of critique by withdrawing from conventional living 
arrangements and conventional arenas of political participation. In both periods, 
actors disengaged (not least physically) from the dominant social order and its 
normative grammar and hence occupied an external position to it, thus taking 
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an alternative viewpoint. It is pointed out that the question whether and in how 
far this exit constitutes critique is negotiated by the actors themselves. 
This discussion and comparison of the communards’ praxis in two time pe-
riods points to an important characteristic of this “exit-variety of critique.” The 
performance of withdrawal was at both times driven by experiences of injustice 
and indignation in combination with the perception that legitimate channels 
towards the broad public were blocked or useless. The 1960s communards 
found no legitimate way to the public because they criticized the “culture” for 
corrupting the civic instruments to establish collectives. Today’s communards, 
in contrast, criticize global entanglements and hence consider the civic sphere 
within the nation-state at best useless for the problems they want to address. At 
the global level, however, no legitimate instruments to form collectives are in 
sight.  
Next to this commonality, this study also points out important differences 
within this “exit variety of critique.” While the communal critique in the long 
1960s was based on the inspired, civic, and domestic worlds, communards 
never successfully established a collective normative grammar. Their radical 
critique found expression in a mass of individual acts of transgression, existen-
tial tests. In contrast, today’s communards leave behind their consumption 
habits, flats, and sometimes jobs because this withdrawal enables them to live 
in ways which more consistently put into practice their ideas about sustainabil-
ity and community. Thus, the withdrawal into intentional communities today is 
not a radical critique of mainstream society but rather a reformist critique of 
specific tests. From an inspired perspective, communards criticize tests con-
cerning the quality of life and community; from an industrial perspective they 
question tests around the efficient and sustainable use of common resources. 
While this article does not provide an explanation for this transformation of the 
communal critique, it may be worthwhile to analyse its relationship to the 
transformation of capitalism in Western democracies described by Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2007).  
Overall, this article shows that people turn to the exit-variety of critique 
when they experience indignation, but have no legitimate instruments at their 
disposal to articulate and generalize their suffering in order to establish a col-
lective. Given that the international level increasingly influences the lives of 
people through global competition, transnational corporations, and international 
organizations, as long as there are no options for the establishment of meaning-
ful collectives at this level, instances of the exit-variety of critique can be ex-
pected to increase. Hence, a debate about the conditions of possibility, conse-
quences, and desirability of the exit-variety of critique is needed. For such a 
discussion, this article has laid some groundwork. 
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